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Introduction
This paper deals with a newly observed phenomenon which lies at the interface of the semantics and pragmatics of aspectual still (as in John is still asleep), namely the fact that still is systematically infelicitous when the time described by the sentence (or more technically, the reference time) is not given a specific characterization by a temporal adverbial or the utterance context. The main claim I make is that this kind of infelicity results from the fact that in such constructions the use of still is uninformative.
The analysis, which is couched within a DRT framework (Kamp 1981) , also argues for two more general theoretical points. First, I show that the data cannot be accounted for by using current definitions of the presupposition triggered by still. I propose a modified definition of still which, following Ippolito's 2007 analysis, uses one eventuality variable in both the assertion and presupposition of sentences with still, but, unlike this theory, does not require the denotation of this variable to be contextually salient. Second, as opposed to many current theories, I show that the data on still supports a view where tense in past tense sentences is not necessarily anaphoric or pronominal, but rather potentially existentially closed and novel. The novel data is described in section 1. Section 2 gives background about the anaphoric vs. novel characterization of tense and reference times and about the semantics of still. After examining some potential explanations of the data in section 3, and pointing out their shortcomings, I turn to my own proposal for the semantics of still in section 4, and show how it can account for the novel data. Section 5 examines the compatibility of the analysis with current claims on presuppositions and informativity. Section 6 concludes the paper and examines some remaining questions and directions for further research.
The newly observed data: felicitous vs. infelicitous occurrences of still
I will be concerned with felicity contrasts exemplified in (1):
(1)
A: How's John?
B:
Well, he is (still) unemployed (but we hope he will have a job soon)
B' : Well, he was (#still) unemployed (but now he has a job)
As seen in (1), the still-less versions of both present and past tense sentences are felicitous. 1 However, whereas when adding still to the present tense (1B) this felicity is maintained, adding it to the past tense (1B') renders it strikingly infelicitous. Similar felicity contrasts are found in other minimally contrasting present/past tense sentences, e.g. (2)- (4):
There is an important meeting tonight.
B: I won't be able to be there. I am (still) ill, and I must rest.
B': I won't be able to be there. I was (#still) ill, and I must rest. What is the reason for this contrast? No direct answer to this question can be found in the literature on still, simply because this kind of data has not yet been examined in any theory dealing with this particle. Of course, one might be tempted to stipulate that still is simply bad with the past tense, and fine only with the present tense. However, not only is this generalization unmotivated, but, as the felicity of still in (5B)-(8B) shows, it is simply wrong:
Well, I saw him last month. He was (still) unemployed.
(6) A: Look at this poor building! It was so much nicer in the 1980s! B:
Were you (still) living in it then?
A: I heard lots of stories about Mr. Smith.
Me too. During the war he was (still) very rich.
A:
Yes. John came in and told me about it. But I was (still) ill, so I told him that I must rest and that I won't be able to arrive.
1 One may claim here that a past tense answer to a present tense question as in (1B'), is, or should be, infelicitous even without still, due to the tense mismatch which could lead to incoherent discourse. However, all my informants accepted such discourses with no problems. One potential explanation of this could be that A is not asking how John is at the moment of utterance, but more generally, how John is 'these days', to which an answer encompassing the near past is relevant. Another explanation might be that the discourse is coherent because B wants to emphasize John's present situation (having a job) by contrasting it with the past (where he was unemployed). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this potential difficulty. Notice, though, that some past tense sentences may be perfectly felicitous without having clear relevance to the present. For example, a teacher can felicitously utter the out of the blue (ii). Notice that still is infelicitous here too:
(ii) Shakespeare (#still) lived in England.
The occurrence of still in these past tense sentences is a lot better than in (1B')-(4B') above.
The difference between the two types of sentence seems to be related to the specification of the reference time. Intuitively, what all felicitous past tense sentences in (5B)-(8B) seem to share is that their reference time is specified by an adverbial in the previous sentence (as in (5)), in the sentence itself (as in (6) and (7)), or by the eventuality time of the previous sentence (i.e. the time when John told me about the meeting, in (8)). In contrast, no specification of the reference time seems to exist in the past tense (1B'-4B'), and A's utterances in these sentences do not supply any exact specification of that time either.
It should become clear now what the felicitous past tense sentences in (5B)-(8B) share
with the felicitous present tense sentences in (1B)-(4B) above: in the latter case too, the reference time can be said to be specified, namely, to refer to the speech time of the sentence.
These intuitions can be informally summarized as in (9): (9) still can only be felicitous in a sentence whose reference time is specified by / refers to another time in the linguistic or discourse context.
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The immediate aim of this paper is to explain this novel generalization. In the next section, I
examine some background assumptions concerning the two main components of the analysis, namely the characterization of reference times, and the semantics of still. In section 4 I show that once these two components are defined appropriately, their interaction leads to a natural explanation of the generalization in (9).
Some background: characterizing reference times and the semantics of still
2.1. Reference times, eventuality times and speech times 2.1.1 Basics. I follow here ideas developed and used in e.g. Partee 1973 , 1984 , Hinrichs 1986 , Kamp & Reyle 1993 , Ogihara 1994 , Kratzer 1998 . Following the tradition of Reichenbach 1947, these theories analyze the temporal structure of sentences using three temporal parameters: the speech time, the reference time, and the eventuality time.
In simple sentences, the tense node denotes a time argument which stands for the reference time of the sentence, and whose position is determined relative to the speech time. Specifically, in present tense sentences, the reference time equals the speech time, 4 and in past tense sentences, it precedes it. 5 Locating temporal adverbs update the reference time. For example, in John woke up at 9.00, the denotation of at 9.00 is processed in the beginning and updates the reference time to be a time prior to the speech time, equal to 9.00. The speech time (now) is a contextually salient time, and like other contextually salient arguments, its value is given by a contextually supplied assignment function g c (see e.g. Heim 1994 ).
As for the eventuality time, represented as τ(e), aspectual factors determine its position relative to the reference time. In simple sentences, the time of eventive/perfective predicates, is taken to be included in the reference time, whereas the time of stative or imperfective (progressivized) predicates is taken to include or overlap it. For example, in (10a), with eventive predicates, the eventuality times of seeing Mary and writing the letter are included in yesterday afternoon, whereas in (10b) the stative / imperfective eventualities of being very ill and writing the letter temporally overlap yesterday afternoon, and may even include that time: c. ∃t' t'< t ∧ || ¬I turn off the stove|| t'
3 Notice that although the use of the term 'reference time' in these theories is inspired by Reichenbach's notion, it is not necessarily identical to the Reichenbachian usage. In this paper I use the terms as it is used in Partee 1973 , 1984 , Hinrichs 1986 , Kamp & Reyle 1993 , Ogihara 1994 , Kratzer 1998 , and as defined above. Comparing this and the Reichenbachian uses of the term is beyond the scope of this paper, but see e.g. Partee 1984 and Nelken and Francez 1995 for some comparisons. 4 Given this view, the present tense is anaphoric and not merely 'indexical'. This is part of a general tendency in the modern semantic literature, which assumes that the traditional distinction between anaphoric (or more precisely, co-referring) and indexical (or deictic) uses of pronouns need not be maintained, and does not seem to have real linguistic significance (see e.g. the discussion in Heim & Kratzer 1998, p. 239-242) . A similar position regarding anaphoric and indexical uses of tense is held in e.g. Partee's 1973 Partee's , 1984 , and reviewed in section 2.1.2. 5 Heim 1993 and others take this information to be a presuppositional component of tense. For simplicity reasons, I will not attempt to represent this presuppositional status in the DRT-based analysis I propose below (although this is perfectly compatible with what I will suggest).
Instead, Partee claims, the reference time of (11a) with the 'perfect' auxiliary have). Thus, the reference time of (13a) is indeed pronominal: it is anaphoric to the utterance time (due to the present tense) and, due to the perfect aspect, it asserts that the event time is over by the reference (utterance) time, i.e. that the event is in the past. This suggestion, however, is problematic if we want to maintain the more intuitive view that sentences like (13a) express simple past, and not present perfect.
Partee 1984 admits that the reference time of (13b) seems to be 'some time in the past', but maintains that it is, in fact, anaphoric, and suggests that it is "large, vague, and possibly even irrelevant …(and)… could potentially be "the whole of the past" " (p.314). According to her, the reason we understand the killing of Julius Caesar to happen 'some time before now' is because of the well known condition that the event time is included in the reference time. This explanation, however, would not work for questions with state verbs like "Who admired Julius
Caesar?", which are also understood as asking about a state which took place some time in the past. Unlike events, which are assumed to be included in the reference time (here "the whole of the past"), states are supposed to include or overlap it. It is not clear, then, why we necessarily get the existential reading in such cases too.
In addition, the reference time of some negative sentences does not seem to be anaphoric, but rather existentially closed and novel. (14), for example, neither means that John didn't build that church in a contextually salient past time, nor that there is a contextually salient past time where he didn't build it, but rather that he never built this church, i.e. that there is no past time which overlaps a John-building-this-church eventuality:
(14) John didn't build this church.
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Besides 'out of the blue' questions and negative sentences, there are also affirmative past tense sentences, uttered in context, whose reference time seems existentially closed. I believe that (15B), the still-less version of (1B') above, is one such sentence:
How's John ? B: Well, he was unemployed (but now he has a job).
Although (15B) is not uttered out of the blue, but rather against the context of (15A), this context does not give us any information about the location of the past reference time of (15B).
Intuitively, this reference time is novel, meaning 'some time in the past', as in (16):
There may be two potential objections to this representation. First, one may say that although the context in (15A) does not seem to supply a unique past reference time, the speaker has a certain time in mind which he is referring to when uttering (15B This intuition is usually captured using an assertion and a presupposition. (18) is taken to assert that John is asleep now, and presuppose that he was also asleep for some time before and up to now. I will henceforth call this latter component the 'prior time' presupposition and will deal a lot with the best way to precisely formalize it. Before doing that, however, let us examine a potential problem for this approach to still in general.
As mentioned above, eventualities denoted by stative or progressivized predicates (with which still typically occur) are standardly taken to include or overlap the reference time.
However, when the reference time is denoted by point adverbials, like "at 6.13", "when the bell 8 In this sense, we may say that the use of past tense in (15B) is similar to the use of a specific indefinite NP as in John spoke with some/a woman. As with the existential reading of the past tense, the semantic structure of such sentences contains existential quantification over an individual woman. Even if the speaker has a certain individual woman in mind when uttering it, this information is not part of the semantic structure, and crucially, unlike what happens with real pronouns, the felicity of the sentence does not depend on the listener's ability to identify this individual. 9 Cf. claims in e.g. Bonomi 1995. 10 One may also claim that this restriction should not be part of the semantic structure of (15B) at all, but is provided by the pragmatics (e.g. by the need to make a true and relevant assertion). I will not try to develop this approach here, but continue to take (17) as a possible representation of (15B').
rang", or even "now", the intuitions tend to be stricter: in such cases the states seem not merely to overlap, but to surround the point reference times, i.e. to obtain both before and after such points of time. For example, (19a) Given such observations, some theories (e.g. Moens 1987, Moens and Steedman, Vlach 1981) have taken this temporal 'surrounding' intuition to be, in fact, a defining property of stative predicates (sometimes referred to as 'the superinterval property'). The problem for the approach to still described above is that if these theories are right, then the 'prior time' presupposition triggered by still comes out trivial. For example, the presupposition that John was asleep before 6.13 (in (20a)) would be completely trivial if the still-less (20b)
independently entails that the sleeping state holds both before and after 6.13: presupposition is the only contribution of still 11 , or the assumption that states must surround point reference times, should be rejected.
I believe it is the second assumption which should be rejected, since, as has been convincingly shown by other theories (e.g. Partee 1984 , Hinrichs 1986 , Dowty 1986 , Lascarides and Asher 1993 , Ogihara 1994 , de Swart and Verkuyl 1999 Here the states get an "inceptive" or an "inchoative" reading, and they do 'move the narrative forward'. 12 Similar examples are found in Dowty 1986 , who claims that the 'superinterval property' of statives is a cancelable implicature, and not part of their Semantics.
Even more relevant to us are cases in which the stative or progressive predicates are used with point adverbials or in present tense. Consider, for example, the sentences in (22) (with the stative or progressive predicates underlined for clarity):
(22) a. We weren't sure whether John will participate in the race or not, but at 2.00, when the gun went off, he was running. e. At 6.13 John was asleep.
(23a), for example, is potentially ambiguous between a reading where John was already miserable when he heard the bad news, and a more salient one where he wasn't (he became miserable as a result of hearing the bad news). Similarly (23b) can be uttered just as the plane takes off (so 'being in the air' is not necessarily true before now), (23c) can be true if the baby was asleep a second ago, (23d) can be true even if a second before 2.01 John was not unemployed yet and (23e) can, in fact, be true even if John was not asleep before 6.13. This is exactly the reason why adding still to such sentences they nontrivially entail that the states hold also before the reference time. For example, adding still to (23a) (When John heard that his father died he was still miserable) clearly disambiguates it, excluding the reading where John became miserable when he heard the bad news. The same holds for the other sentences in (23).
To summarize, still indeed triggers a 'prior time' presupposition, and this presupposition is not trivial, exactly because in reality states do not necessarily surround their reference time, but only overlap or include it.
14 We can now turn to a closer and more precise examination of this 'prior time' presupposition.
Two formulations of the assertion and presupposition of sentences with 'still': I will focus
here on two formulations of the assertion and presupposition of sentences with still found in the literature. First, following Löbner 1989, Krifka 2000 defines the assertion and presupposition of sentences like (18) as in (24), where Φ(t) is true iff Φ is true throughout an interval t, and t∝t' iff t' began before t and abuts it (cf. König 1977 , Mittwoch 1993 :
Using the more detailed temporal framework reviewed above with speech times, reference times and eventuality times, the assertion of (18), which is identical to the assertion of the stillless sentence John is asleep, will be represented as in (25a), asserting that there is a sleeping eventuality of John whose time overlaps the speech time (now). Given this, the presupposition of (18) in (24b) can be rephrased as in (25b), saying that there is a sleeping eventuality of John whose time overlaps some time prior to and abutting now:
14 Of course, this conclusion is dependent on the assumption that there is no subclass of stative predicates which necessarily entail (and not only strongly implicate) the truth of the eventualities at a time before the reference time. If such stative predicates are found then we should expect still to be systematically infelicitous with them. Felicity of still with such hypothesized predicates will indeed pose a difficulty for the theories followed in this paper, which take the contribution of still to the sentence to be its 'prior time' presupposition. However, that I am not aware of a such a subclass. Notice, for example, that although Ogihara 1994 claims that progressivized predicates cannot be inchoative (i.e. that they must have the 'superinterval property'), this characterization does not seem right in light of the perfect felicity of (22a) above, with a progressivized verb. But further research should look more closely at this question. 15 It is important to notice that the overlap relation between the eventuality time and the reference time will hold for all sentences with still, since, as seen in (i) It is crucial for Ippolito that the eventuality variable in both the presupposition (in (26a) and assertion in (26b) denotes the same (contextually salient) eventuality. According to her, this guarantees the 'continuity' feeling found with aspectual still:
The sentence John is still cooking presupposes that there is a time earlier than the speech time such that the running time of a salient eventuality of John's cooking includes this past time, and asserts of that eventuality that its running time includes the speech time.
[..…] because the assertion is about that very salient eventuality, the sequence ["Two days ago John was cooking. He is still cooking"] is understood as talking about a single event stretching over two days, for the second clause requires that John's current cooking be salient in the context and that it overlap a past time. (Ippolito 2007: 11) In contrast, in the reformulation of Krifka's definition in (25) above, the assertion and the presupposition need not necessarily talk about the same eventuality of John's sleeping (or cooking), and the continuity intuition is captured by explicitly using the abutting relation. In addition, unlike Ippolito, who insists that the eventuality argument in sentences with still is contextually salient, no such requirement is made in the definition in (25).
Some potential explanations of the data
Before presenting my own account of the contrast between felicitous and infelicitous occurrences of still, repeated in (27), let us briefly look at some alternative explanations of it: However, given the felicity of (27B') and (27B'') this cannot be right. The only difference between (27B) and (27B') is tense. Crucially, both are uttered against the same context, and in neither of them is there any reference to a salient eventuality of John being unemployed.
Similarly (27B'') differs minimally from (27B) in that the reference time is said to be last June (instead of being unspecified). This sentence too does not make the eventuality of John being unemployed any more salient than (27B) does. The problem with (27B), then, has to do with the saliency of the reference time, not that of the eventuality argument.
In general, then, we see that the eventuality referred to by the VP need not be salient in order for still to be felicitous. In fact, this can be seen even in completely 'out of the blue' utterances with still. (28) can be the first thing I say to a guest of mine as I open the door for her. Crucially, even if the guest doesn't know in advance that the baby was asleep, (or, for that matter, that I have a baby), she could easily accommodate this information:
The baby is still asleep. Please be quiet !
In addition, we cannot attribute the infelicity of (27B) to a general difficulty in accommodating presuppositions, of the sort which has been claimed for the presuppositions of too and again (see, for example, Geurts & van der Sandt 2004 , Zeevat 2003 . The felicity of (27B') and (27B'') indicates that no such general problem is found with still. The felicity of (28) also shows the 'prior time' presupposition triggered by still can be accommodated like other types of presuppositions, e.g. those triggered by definite (like the baby).
Another promising idea is to try and attribute the contrast in (27) to the tendency of sentences with still to express surprise that the state (referred to by the VP) continues and hasn't stopped yet. 16 For example John is still asleep seems to implicate or presuppose surprise at the fact that John is asleep now, although he was no longer supposed to be asleep. One might want to claim, then, that this kind of 'surprise' implication can only arise when the reference time is specified. For example, it is not surprising that there is a time at which John continued to be asleep, if he was asleep, but it may be surprising now, or at 5 p.m. or when Harry arrived.
Perhaps the lack of 'surprise' effect is what causes the infelicity of (27B).
However, as has been already noted in e.g. It seems, then, that a different direction is needed in order to explain the infelicitous occurrence of still. In the next section I turn to develop such a direction.
The analysis

A modified, DRT style, definition of still
Since we will be dealing here with updating reference times in different contexts, it will be very useful to couch the semantics of still within a DRT framework, in which such pieces of information are easily represented. I assume familiarity with DRT, and will make the following simplifications and notational decisions: I will use a bracket notation, as in Geurts 1999, in which the variable e is used for all eventualities and (ignoring tense for a moment) the DRS of 17 Both attribute it to the interaction between the semantics of still and the Gricean maxim of relevance. 18 One may argue that the 'surprise' effect with still should be always evaluated with respect to a certain perspective, so that even with explicit adverbials like 'unsurprisingly', it is possible to have in mind a perspective with respect to which it is in fact surprising that e.g. John continues to be angry this morning, or continues to be asleep at 7.00 (in (29a) and (29c), respectively). If this direction is taken, however, we should be able to say very precisely why it is that the existence of a perspective for a surprise effect is always possible with specific or anaphoric reference times, but systematically blocked with existentially closed ones. Such problems may be solved once a precise theory of the surprise effect with still is developed. At the present stage, however, this direction does not seem to provide a satisfying way of accounting for the newly observed data described in section 1.
John ran will be [e: john-run(e)] instead of the more precise [e,x: x=john, run(e,x)] (or the even more precise [e,x: x=john, run(e), agent(e) =x]). This is because the focus of this paper is on the relationship between times, not individuals. For this reason, I will not try to systematically capture nominal anaphora. For example, I will represent the second sentence of John left the room. He was tired as [e: john-tired(e)] (again ignoring tense). I will take the relationship between the reference time and the imperfective eventuality time (e.g. running time of lexical statives and progressives) to be O(overlap) instead of inclusion (⊆) (though using inclusion will be just as compatible with my claims below).
For illustration, let us look at the representation of the present tense (31a) in (31b) :
John is asleep b.
[n, t, e: john asleep (e), t=now, tOτ(e)]
In (31b), the reference time of the clause, namely t, is equated with the speech time ('now'), since the sentence is in the present tense, and is taken to overlap the eventuality time, since the type of eventuality is stative. After existential closure the sentence asserts that there is a sleeping eventuality of John whose time overlaps the speech time interval (i.e. now).
Having these notational issues in mind, I propose the following modified definition of the assertion and presupposition of still (where t r and t ps stand for the reference time of the sentence, and the time variable introduced in the 'prior time' presupposition, respectively):
(32) Assuming a clause Φ, with reference time t r and a predicate P with an eventuality e s.t. P(e), (a) still Φ is defined iff the universe of Φ has a time interval t ps. which meets the following two conditions: t ps. <t r , t ps. O τ(e) (b) If defined, then still Φ is true iff [t r ,e: P(e), t r O τ(e)]
Notice that, as in the reformulation of Krifka's definition in (25) above, here too the assertion of stillΦ, given in (32b), is equivalent to the assertion of the corresponding Φ without still.
Thus, the only thing we have to add to the DRS of a sentence with still is the 'prior time' presupposition, given by the definedness condition in (32a). Following Geurts' 1999 notation of underlying presupposed material, then, the DRS of the present tense (33a) will be (33b), which, after existential closure will give us (33c):. According to (34d), (34c) asserts that an eventuality where John is unemployed temporally overlaps some past time, and presupposes that this eventuality temporally overlaps some time prior to that past time as well. More intuitively, the meaning we get is that a state of John being unemployed continues at some past time.
Why is this meaning infelicitous, then? The reason, I suggest, is that it is not informative. Intuitively, if the denotation of t is not salient, then saying that a state P continues at t (the information of the sentence with still) does not add anything to saying that a state P holds at t (the information of the sentence without still). More precisely, in such a case, both 19 van der Sandt 1992 and Geurts 1999 assume that accommodated presuppositions are projected as high as possible. This is irrelevant in (33b) since the home DRS of the presupposition is also the top DRS here.
the assertion and the prior time presupposition of stillΦ can be met in the still-less Φ as well.
Consequently the use of still is unjustified and thus its presence is infelicitous.
To see this more clearly, consider the schema in (35a) for the still-less (34a), where there is some past time t which temporally overlaps a John-unemployed eventuality. Given the indicated context, the denotation of t is not being made salient in any way. We further assume that states are not temporally instantaneous, e.g. that the time of being unemployed is a nonsingleton interval:
Crucially, this information is enough to guarantee that both the assertion and the 'prior time' presupposition of (34c) ("John was still unemployed") are met. More specifically, given the information in (35a) one can automatically infer (35b):
Given the information in (35b), we can infer both that (a) there is a past subinterval of t, t', which overlaps a ''John-unemployed' eventuality (namely the assertion of John was still unemployed), as well as (b) that there is another past subinterval of t, t'', such that t'' <t' which also overlaps a ''John-unemployed' eventuality, (namely the presupposition of John was still unemployed). The result is, then, that by accepting the truth of (34a) (John was unemployed),
we can automatically infer both the assertion, as well as the 'prior time' presupposition of (34c) (John was still unemployed). But, crucially, this 'prior time' presupposition is the contribution of still to the sentence (remember that the assertion of still p is just like that of p). Thus, both this presupposition, as well of the assertion, are met without still, so using still is unjustified and vacuous, and hence, infelicitous.
Notice that the same problem remains when we take the existential quantification over the reference time of (34a) to be restricted, as in (17) above, repeated here as (36): (36) [n, e, t: John-unemployed (e), t<n, t⊂D ,t O τ(e)]
As explained in section 2.1.2 above, the idea of having the restriction D in (36) is that the unrestricted existential quantification in (34b) seems too permissive: In thinking about some time in the past which overlaps a John-unemployed state we clearly don't talk about e.g. a time
where John was not born yet, or where he was a baby. Thus D in (36) is characterized by the presuppositions and implications of the sentence, and can be thought of as, e.g. the period where John is alive and grown up, which properly includes the eventuality time where John is unemployed. Given these considerations the still-less (34a) can be represented as in (37a): (38) says that some past time t, inside a relevant period D, overlaps some John-unemployed eventuality and that some time t ps. , prior to t, which is also in that period D 20 , overlaps this eventuality as well.
The problem is that, as with the unrestricted version of (34a), here too the use of still is uninformative. This is because here too we can always 'divide' the reference time of the stillless version of the sentence into a past time t', and a past time prior to t', t'', both overlapping the time of the unemployed eventuality. This is seen in (37b):
In such a case too, then, we can infer both the assertion and presupposition of the version with still (namely DRS (38)) from the still-less version (DRS (36)). Thus the uninformativity, and hence the infelicity of still is accounted for.
still with point adverbials and punctual reference times.
In contrast to the infelicitous presence of still in (34c), consider the perfect felicity of this particle in (39a) or (39b):
(39) a. (How's John?). Well, a month ago he was (still) unemployed.
b. At 6.00 p.m., I was (still) in my room.
Here, the reference time is anaphoric to the salient time which is a month before the speech time, and to 6.00 p.m., respectively. We know that states overlap, and do not necessarily surround their reference time (see again the discussion in section 2.2.1). The prior time presupposition, then, rules out the possibility that the state starts only at the point reference time, and ensures that it holds before it. Consequently, the use of still, which triggers the 'prior time' presupposition is informative and felicitous. For illustration, consider the DRS for the still-less version of (39b) in (40a) and two possible schemas for it, i.e. (40b) and (40c):
(40) a.
[n, t, e: I-in my room (e), t<now, t=6, tOτ(e)] b.
in my room (I) ----------------6-----------------------now c. in my room (I) ----------------6-----------------------now
(40a) requires that the 'being in the room' eventuality temporally overlaps the reference time, which, in this case, is 6.00. As claimed in section 2.2.1 above, this is compatible with a case like (40b), where I am in my room before 6 as well, and also with a case like (40c), where I being in the room started at 6.00. 21 Adding still yields the DRS in (41): (41) [ n, t, e, t ps. : I-in my room (e), t<now, t=6, tOτ(e), t ps. <t, t ps. Oτ(e)]
(41) asserts that some being-in-the-room eventuality overlaps a past 6 p.m. time, and presupposes that this eventuality also overlaps some time before that 6 p.m. time. Once the prior time presupposition is added, then, the DRS is now only compatible with a situation like (40b), and rules out a situation like (40c). Thus, there is no way of automatically inferring, on the basis of the still-less DRS in (40a), the presupposition in (41), namely that I was also in my room before 6 p.m.. This information has to exist in the common ground, or else, has to be accommodated by the listener. Thus, still p is not equivalent to p, since it is true in fewer situations than p. Hence the use of still, then, is informative, justified and felicitous. The same holds for all examples with point adverbials (in e.g. (23) Oh no ! The baby is (still) awake ! As explained in section 2.2.1 above, the still-less versions are compatible with scenarios in which the eventuality time starts at the speech time. (42a), for example, can be uttered just as the plane takes off and (42b) can be uttered even when the baby was asleep until now. The addition of still excludes these situations and thus its use is informative and felicitous. 21 It is also compatible, of course, with a situation where being in my room equals 6, or ends at 6.
There are, of course, other cases of contextually salient times. In a context where we talk about Yitzhak Rabin's murder, the reference time of a sentence like (43) will be anaphoric with the time of the murder, so still will be informative and felicitous too:
(43) John was (still) in London.
Still with frame adverbials and non-punctual reference times
One may hypothesize at this point that still is felicitous in e.g. (39b), (42) and (43) above because the reference times in these sentences are "short" or punctual so, unlike the reference time in the infelicitous past tense (35c) above (#John was still unemployed), they cannot be 'divided' into two successive subintervals.
But this hypothesis is refuted by the felicity of still with 'frame' temporal adverbials, as in examples (6) and (7) above, or as in (44) or (45). Such adverbials denote 'long', nonpunctual times, which can, in principle, also be 'divided' into two successive subintervals:
(44) In the summer, Anne was (still) writing her book.
(45) Mary was (still) in France in June.
To understand why still is felicitous in these sentences, we first have to examine their temporal structure. There are, in fact, two views in the literature regarding the representation of frame adverbials, and as we shall see now, the interpretation and felicity of still with such adverbials can help us decide between them.
According to Pancheva & von Stechow 2004, for example, frame adverbials as in (44) and (45) But if we follow (47), it is not clear why (45), unlike the past tense (35c) above, is felicitous.
Following the reasoning described above, here too we should be able to derive the truth of (45) from the truth of its still-less version: Once there is some past interval within June which overlaps e, we can always infer that (a) there is a subinterval of that time, also within June, overlapping with e, and (b) there is a successive subinterval of that time, also within June, which overlaps e as well. The use of still, then, is predicted to be uninformative and hence, infelicitous, just as in (35c) above. However, unlike (35c) , (45) is perfectly felicitous.
One possible conclusion can be that our explanation of the infelicity of (35c) above, in terms of the uninformativity of still, is on the wrong track. I will suggest, however, that this explanation is correct, and instead, it is the DRSs in (46) (and consequently also (47)) which are wrong. The main independent reason to suggest this is that a DRS like (46) (45) is that Mary was in France before June, i.e. at least during the last day(s) of May. This is evident from the infelicity of (48): (48) #Mary was still in France in June. She arrived there on June 13th.
A better representation of (45), then, should take the denotation of the adverbial to be identical to the reference time, as suggested in e.g. Kamp & Reyle 1993, and Artstein 2005 . E.g. (49) and (50) would be the DRS of (45b) (50) asserts that an eventuality of Mary being in France overlaps some past time which is June, and presupposes that this eventuality also overlaps some time before that June. This DRS is supported both by the interpretation of (45), since it correctly captures the intuition that (45) presupposes that Mary was in France (at least some time) at the end of May, as well as by the felicity of still in it: Assuming the DRSs in (49) and (50), the presupposition triggered by still cannot be derived from the truth of the still-less version: Although it is true that we can 'divide' the reference time, i.e. June, into two succeeding intervals (e.g. June 1 st to 15th, and June 16 th to 31th) these two subintervals would not correspond to the intervals in the presupposition and assertion of (45), respectively, because the former requires that being in France overlaps a time before June (and not before part of June). Crucially, this kind of information cannot be inferred from the still-less version, and must be supplied by the context, or accommodated. Hence, the use of still in (45), as well as in other sentences with frame adverbials, is informative and felicitous.
Finally, just like punctual reference times, which need not be explicitly referred to by point adverbials, but can be anaphoric with contextually salient punctual times (e.g. the speech time in present tense sentences), non-punctual reference times too can be supplied not only by frame adverbials, as in (44) and (45), but also by a contextually salient 'periods'. Consider, for example (51) and (52) in the indicated contexts:
(51) (Context: we are in a history class dealing with the middle ages)
The lecturer: Don't forget that people believed in ghosts (then)! (52) (Context: we are in a middle of a conversation about John's sabbatical many years ago.)
John: I was an associate professor (then).
In the indicated contexts the reference time of these sentence is t<n, t=the middle ages, and t<n, t=my sabbatical, respectively. Thus, both sentences can be paraphrased by adding the deictic adverbial then to them. We predict that adding still to such sentences will be felicitous, even without the addition of an explicit "then". This prediction is borne out:
(53) (Context: we are in a history class dealing with the middle ages)
The lecturer: Don't forget that people still believed in ghosts ! (54) (Context: we are talking about John's sabbatical many years ago.)
John: I was still an associate professor.
Since in both cases the reference time is anaphoric to the contextually salient period, still is informative and felicitous. It triggers the presupposition that the state holds also before that period, i.e. that the church believed in ghosts before the middle ages, and that I was an associate professor before my sabbatical as well, respectively.
It is important to notice, then, that contextually salient periods are different from 'relevant' periods, of the sort we looked at in the restricted reading of "John was unemployed".
'Relevant periods' (e.g. the period where John is alive and grown up, in the case of considering "John was unemployed"), are triggered by the presuppositions and / or implications of the sentence, and constitute domain restrictions, D, on the existential quantification over the reference time (i.e. we assume that t⊂D). In contrast, as we saw above, contextually salient periods (as in examples (51) and (52)), do not constitute domain restriction on the existential quantification over the reference time, but rather give the value of the reference time, just like the denotation of explicit frame adverbials (and similar to denotation of punctual adverbials).
That is, if P C is a contextually salient period and t is the reference time of the sentence then we take t=P C and not t⊂P C 22 .
The difference between the two types of periods can be tested by paraphrases with the deictic adverbial then. Unlike (51) and (52), with contextually salient periods, where using then is natural, when we have implicit domain restricting the existential quantification over times which is not contextually salient but 'relevant', the use of then is odd. This is seen in (55) 
One eventuality, not two, in the definition of still
The data with frame adverbials, examined above, supports Ippolito's 2007 claim, adopted in the definition in (32) above, that the assertion and presupposition triggered by still make use of one eventuality. To see why this is the case suppose that instead of (32), the definition of the assertion and presupposition of still was (56), where the presupposition of still makes reference to a new P eventuality variable, and the temporal continuity between the presupposed and the asserted eventuality (which in
Ippolito's theory are captured by using a single state), is guaranteed by explicitly using Krifka's 2000 abutting relation:
(56) An alternative semantics for still (with no guarantee for one eventuality):
Assuming a clause Φ, with reference time t r and a predicate P with an eventuality e s.t. P(e), (a) still Φ is defined iff the universe of Φ has a time interval t ps. and an eventuality e', which meet the following conditions: P(e'), t ps. α t r , t ps. O τ(e') (b) If defined, then still Φ is true iff [t r ,e: P(e), t r O τ(e)]
Given this alternative definition of still, and assuming, as before, that the DRS of the still-less (57) is (58), the DRS of (57) with still would be now (59) (instead of (50) above):
(57) In June Mary was (still) in France (58) [n,t,e: Mary-in-France(e), t<n, t=June, τ(e)Ot]
(59) [n,t,e,t ps. e': Mary-in-France(e), t<n, t=June, τ(e)Ot, t ps α t, Mary-in France (e'),
τ(e')Ot ps ]:
unfortunately, outside the scope of this paper. First, it is important to check whether this distinction holds with respect to other types of quantification over times as well (e.g. adverbial quantification, see e.g. Partee 1984) . Second, it is interesting to check whether this distinction in the temporal domain carries over the nominal domain. At least on the surface the answer seems to be negative. That is, default existential quantification over individuals can be restricted by contextually salient domains. In the context of talking about my Semantics class, for example, the interpretation of (i) seems to be 'a student in my class asked me for an extension': (i) Yesterday a student asked me for an extension.
(59) asserts that some eventuality e where Mary is in France overlaps some past June, and presupposes that some such eventuality, e', overlaps some time prior to and abutting that June.
It is important to notice that although e and e' in this DRS are different eventuality variables they do not necessarily denote different eventualities. Crucially, however, they can denote two such different eventualities. This possibility leads to predicting incorrect truth conditions for (57), since now the DRS in (59) is compatible with a discontinuous stay of Mary in France, e.g.
with a situation where Mary arrived in France from May 24 th to the end of May (which is a time prior to and abutting June), left France, and came back to France from June 23rd to June 29th. In such a case, it is true that there is a being-in-France eventuality which overlaps June, and that there is a being-in-France eventuality overlaps a time prior to and abutting June, as (59) requires. The problem is that (57) Similar argumentation can be used to show that defining still in temporal terms only (as in Krifka's original definition in (24) above), without using an event based semantics, is not enough. Applying this definition to (57) will give us (60), asserting that the sentence 'John is in France' is true at a time which is last June, and presupposing that there is some time before last June in which this sentence is true as well:
(60) a. Assertion of (57): John is in France (t) ∧ t = last June b. Presupposition of (57) 23 Such a situation, though, will make (i), with again, fine; (i) In June Mary was in France again. 24 A potential counterexample to the event based analysis of still, pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, is (i):
(i) There is still a guard at the gate.
'Still' with familiar existentially closed reference times Based on the comparison between
the felicitous and infelicitous sentences above we may want to suggest that still can only be felicitous when the reference time is not existentially closed. A closer examination, however,
shows that this generalization is still not precise enough. Consider (61) In (61), the past tense sentence with still appears after another past tense sentence. Partee 1984 discusses similar discourses without still (as in (11) (63) [n,e,e',t, t', t ps.
: john-open-the-door (e), t<n, τ(e)⊆ t, mary-undressed (e'), t'<n, t'= τ(e), τ(e')Ot', t ps. <t', τ(e')O t ps. ] According to (63), the first sentence in (61) asserts that there is some opening the door eventuality by John whose time is included in some past time t. This eventuality time supplies the reference time for the second sentence, which says that there is some Mary-being-undressed eventuality whose (past) time overlaps the time where John opened the door. The reference time of the second sentence, then, is indirectly anaphoric with the existentially closed time of the first sentence. A similar thing seems to happen with discourses like (64): (64) John was still unhappy. His grandmother gave him a candy, but it didn't help.
Here still felicitously appears in a past tense sentence which is the first in the discourse.
Intuitively, though, the reference time of the first sentence is nonetheless anaphoric, or more (i) is felicitous even if the guards change regularly, as long as we have temporal continuity. Assuming that events are individualized by their participants, it would be problematic to maintain that we have one eventuality here, which overlaps both the speech time and a time prior to it, as done in this paper. Notice, however, that a similar problem is raised by still-less sentences as in (ii):
(ii) Between 3 and 8, there was a guard at the gate (ii) too can be felicitous if there was one guard from 3 to 6, who was replaced by another guard from 6 to 8. But if indeed having different guards necessarily means having different eventualities, we wrongly predict that (iii) would also be felicitous in this situation, (twice seems to indicate a plurality of events, see Rothstein 2004) :
(iii) Between 3 and 8, there was a guard at the gate twice. But (iii) is infelicitous in this scenario. It can become felicitous if the two different eventualities are characterized not only by different participants, but also by temporal discontinuity. In other words, despite the changing of the participants in (ii), it seems to talk about one eventuality, namely one where there was some guard or another at the gate. It seems to me that the same thing happens in (i).
It is, of course, challenging to understand this pattern, but this is beyond the scope of the present paper. One possible direction is that what we have here is the necessary summing of two eventualities into a single one (what Rothstein 2004 calls S-summing). precisely cataphoric: it is supplied by the eventuality time of the second sentence. This is very similar to cataphora in the nominal domain, as in (65), or (66) cited in Geurts 1999:
(65) When he saw me, John was really surprised.
(66) The doctor kept warning him but he would never listen, and now Harry's dead.
Geurts suggests that in cataphoric cases like (66), the reference to the pronoun him is accommodated, in a similar way to the accommodation of standard presuppositions. I assume that a similar thing happens with (64).
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The interesting point, then, is that in both (61) and (64), the reference time of the past tense sentence with still is indirectly interpreted as existential, but nonetheless, still is felicitous. Given the discussion above, the reason should be clear: Since the reference time of the sentence with still is anaphoric, or cataphoric, to another time (albeit an existential one), the use of still is informative and hence felicitous: For example, the still-less version of (61) is compatible with a situation where Mary finished taking off her clothes just as John opened the door. When the presupposition triggered by still is added, this situation is excluded.
In general, then, the precise feature which distinguishes infelicitous from felicitous uses of still in past tense sentences is not the existential/non-existential interpretation of the reference time, but rather the novel/anaphoric one.
Compatibility of the present analysis with current theories of presuppositions
In the sections above we developed the idea that still is infelicitous in sentences like (67B') since in such a case the prior time presupposition can be trivially inferred from the truth of the still-less version in (67B) and hence its use is uninformative: (67) A: How's John ?
B:
He was unemployed B': #He was still unemployed I would like to finish this paper by examining the compatibility of this claim with current theories of presuppositions. I will focus here on three general suggestions which may be seen as raising problems for the analysis above.
First, a general assumption in the literature, e.g. Stalnaker 1978, is that presuppositions are supposed to be trivial (relative to the common ground). It is unclear, then, why the triviality of the presupposition in (67B') leads to infelicity. This may be seen as all the more problematic in view of the recent literature that claims that certain presupposition triggers are obligatory On the surface this kind of requirement may be seen as the one violated in the case in (67B').
However, the 'Informativity constraints' suggested in these theories are based on the Gricean maxim of quantity (according to Geurts 1999) or manner (according to Beaver & Zeevat (to appear) ). As is well known, and as Geurts 1999 himself emphasizes, such maxims, and the informativity constraint based on them, are defeasible, and many times breaking them leads to some conversational implicatures. This is not what happens in (67B'): as long as the reference time is novel the uninformativity of still does not lead to a conversational implicature, but to infelicity which seems strikingly stronger than the result of typical violations of Gricean maxims. If a Gricean-based informativity constraint is indeed the one violated in (67B'), then the hopeless infelicity of such sentences is unexplained.
A closer look, however, shows that none of these suggestions actually covers cases like (67B'), so these potential problems do not arise in the first place.
First, though it is true that presuppositions are trivial given the common ground, this is not what the analysis above suggests with respect to cases like (67B'). Instead, the 'prior time' presupposition in such a sentence can be trivially inferred from the truth of the still-less version in (67B), which is not part of the common ground. In fact, this still-less version is not uttered at all. It is a potential alternative to (67B').
For a similar reason, the Gricean-based 'Informativity constraints' are not applicable to our case. Consider, for example, Geurts' 1999 version of the constraint, in (68) Finally, though 'Maximize Presupposition' does deal with potential alternatives, it does not apply to (67B') either, for two reasons. First, the principle deals with alternatives which are 26 In addition, unlike the kind of infelicity dealt with in van der Sandt's and Beaver's constraints, no subDRS is entailed by the main DRS in the infelicitous cases with still above (these have no subDRSs to start with).
triggered by lexical items, such as know-believe, the-a, both-every, child-children, ran-run (see Sauerland 2006 for more such lexical items). In contrast, in the cases discussed in this paper, only one of the alternatives contains a lexical item which triggers a presupposition, namely the version with still (e.g. "John was still unemployed"), and the second alternative is simply the same sentence without this lexical item, (namely "John was unemployed", which itself has no presuppositions).
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In addition, the alternatives covered by 'Maximize Presupposition' are characterized as having an equivalent assertive component (in the relevant context), but as forming a presupposition scale, i.e. one has a stronger presupposition than the other. In such a case the principle dictates that one chooses the lexical item with the strongest presupposition. 28 In contrast, although indeed both the still and the still-less versions in (67) This discussion has two important implications. The first is that the Maximize Presupposition principle is not supposed to apply to cases as in (67). Thus, the fact that still is not obligatory in such sentences is not a problem. Second, the fact that the infelicity of still in such sentences is so strong is perhaps due to the fact that still turns out, in fact, to be doubly uninformative in (67B'), namely uninformative both with respect to the content and to the status of the 'prior time' claim: Not only the content of the claim can be inferred from the stillless version, still does not even add the information that the status of this claim is presuppositional.
Summary and directions for further research
The goal of this paper was to explain so far unnoted and unanalyzed infelicitous occurrences of aspectual still. I showed that when still appears in past tense sentences whose reference time is novel and non-anaphoric, the truth of the assertion and that of the 'prior time' presupposition this particle triggers can be both inferred from the truth of the minimally contrasting still-less counterpart. Moreover, in such cases the presuppositional status of the 'prior time' claim is lost, despite the presence of still. Hence the use of still in such sentences is uninformative, and thus unjustified and infelicitous.
Besides the analysis of the novel data, the paper has several more general implications.
First, as far as the semantics of still is concerned, the data analyzed here supports Ippolito's 2007 claim that the assertion and presupposition of still make use of one eventuality argument, but in contrast to Ippolito's theory, suggests that this eventuality argument need not be contextually salient. Second, the analysis has implications for the research of the tense and temporal structure of clauses. I claimed that the interaction of still with frame adverbials supports the view that they denote intervals identical to the reference time of the sentence, rather than including it. I also argued that the contrast between felicitous and infelicitous cases of still can only be explained if, contrary to many current analyses, we assume that past tense is not necessarily anaphoric, but can be represented as a new variable bound by existential closure. In fact, given the analysis above, the felicity or infelicity of still in past tense sentences can be seen as a diagnostic for determining whether or not the reference time in such sentences is anaphoric or not.
The analysis above raises several open questions. For example, above we concentrated on explaining the behavior of still in matrix positive sentences. An obvious extension of the theory is to try and check whether the contrast between the occurrence of still with novel and familiar reference times, and the informativity-based explanation of this contrast, can be carried over to other, more complex structures. Although this step is beyond the scope of the present analysis, I would like to finish the paper by examining one such construction, namely negative sentences.
At least on the surface, the behavior of still in negative sentences seems to pose a problem for the analysis above. 30 Presuppositions are known to project out of the scope of negation. Assuming the informativity-based proposal suggested above, then, one would predict that negative sentences with still will be felicitous even if their reference time is novel, since the problem of uninformativity seen before should not arise here: Unlike the 'positive' sentences above, in such sentences the presupposition, which remains 'positive', would not be able to be inferred from the truth of the negated still-less assertion. The prediction seems to be, then, that, existential past tense negative sentences with still should be felicitous, unlike their positive counterparts. Is this prediction borne out?
There is an obvious complication with answering this question: still has been known for a long time to be a positive polarity item, i.e. to be odd under the scope of negation (see e.g. Baker 1970 , Israel 1996 , Szabolsci 2004 . Thus, the fact that still is infelicitous in the past tense (69a) should not be attributed to the novelty of the reference time in this sentence, since it is just as infelicitous in the present tense (69b), with a familiar reference time: presuppositions are known to scope out of negation, this contrast may be seen as a problem for the informativity-based proposal developed above.
There is, however, a potential solution to this problem. A typical conversational use of extra-clausal negation, as in (70) The sox haven't already clinched the pennant Although (70a) differs from (71b) in that it does not deny the preceding utterance (since it is an answer to a question), we can still assume that the use of the extra-clausal "it isn't true that…'
indicates denial of a contextually salient positive counterpart as well.
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If this is indeed the reason for the infelicity of still in the past tense (70a), we would expect that this kind of contrast in other cases where we get denial of an infelicitous positive counterpart with still. One possible candidate is predicate negation with heavy contrastive stress, as in (72) Wrong! He DIDn't / DID NOT find something. [Szabolsci 2004, p. 413] 31 Horn 1989 takes the cleft construction "It's not that…", which is very similar to the "it is not the case that…" construction in (70) to be one of the typical ways to express meta-linguistic, or 'contradiction' negation
We could predict, then, that as long as still appears with contrastive stress on negation, it would be infelicitous in the past tense, just as in positive sentences. This prediction is borne out, (75) seems worse than the present tense (72) In such sentences too we find the present tense / past tense contrast found with matrix positive sentences, above. It may be possible to use again the 'conversational' explanation for the infelicity of the past tense version of (76a), namely to claim that 'I doubt that John was still unemployed" is infelicitous since the use of doubt that p indicates that p (in our case the infelicitous "John was still unemployed") is contextually salient. However, this kind of explanation does not seem to be carried over to the infelicity of the past tense versions of (76b) and (76c).
I believe, though, that in order to understand better the behavior of still in such sentences one first has to understand better the interaction of the focus sensitivity properties of 32 A reviewer expressed the worry that assuming this kind of argument might lead one to wrongly predict that sentences like (ia) and (ib) should be unacceptable because their positive counterparts, namely (iia) and (iib) are ungrammatical: (i) a. John didn't see any bird b.
John hasn't ever arrived (ii) a. *John saw any bird b.
*John has ever arrived However, as noted above, regular predicate negation, as in (i), is not (necessarily at least) taken to express denial of a salient positive proposition. It is expressions like "It is not true that…" or focused negation which typically have this conversational role. That is, we need instead to check the felicity of sentences as in (iii) and (iv). Indeed, these are not as good as those in (i):
(iii) a. # It is not true that John saw any bird b.
# / ?It is not true that John has ever arrived (iv) a. #John DIDn't see any bird! b.
#/?John HASn't ever arrived ! This contrast is very similar to the well known observation (e.g. Karttunen & Peters 1979 , Horn 1989 ) that what they sometimes call 'contradiction negation' (or metalinguistic negation) cannot license negative polarity items as in (v), from Karttunen & Peters: (v) Chris didn't MANAGE to solve some / *any problem. He solved them easily The exact explanation for this pattern is under debate (see e.g. Horn 1989 for an overview). Thus, it is not clear that the reason for the oddness of NPIs with 'contradiction negation' is the indication of an existing infelicitous positive counterpart (as suggested above for the oddness of still in (70a)), or the fact that this kind of 'meta linguistic negation' cannot count as a licensor for NPIs for semantic or syntactic reasons (see e.g. Linebarger 1987) . But in any case, it seems that the felicity of the NPIs with predicate negation in (i) does not seem to undermine the 'conversational' kind of explanation for the infelicity of still with the cases of 'contradition negation' above.
still with different types of 'negative' sentences. Szabolsci 2004 shows that the PPI someone interacts in a rather complicated way with various types of 'negative' operator (e.g. antimorphic, anti additive and monotone decreasing operators, in van der Wooden 1997 terminology), both in terns of distribution and interpretation. As far as I know no similar work has been done on the PPI still. It may very well turn out that the polarity sensitivity properties of still, and consequently its distribution and interpretation with various 'negative' operators, are even different from that of someone (just as in the realm of NPIs, not all PPIs are equivalent). Further research, then, should first attempt to characterize these properties with familiar reference times (e.g. in present tense). Only then can one start evaluating whether the incompatibility of still with past tense, as in (76), and in other embedded constructions, does, or does not constitute a real problem for the informativity-based analysis developed above.
In addition, further research should also check whether the infelicity of still discussed above is part of a larger pattern of uninformative uses of presuppositions triggers (like already or anymore) or particles in general. 33 Finally, the interaction of still with other tenses and aspects (e.g. future tense, and perfect aspect) should be compared to its interaction with the simple past.
